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Umfassender Versicherungsschutz im
thailändischen Gesundheitssystem: eine
Nutzenanalyse
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Abstract
Mit Hilfe der thailändischen Sozial- und Wirtschaftsdaten aus dem Jahre 2002 untersucht
der Aufsatz die Nutzenverteilung im thailändischen Gesundheitssektor. Analysiert werden
die Verteilungen medizinischer Nutzen von diversen Gruppen innerhalb des thailändi-
schen Gesundheitssystems. Die Studie kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass der Nutzen auf jeder
Ebene des Gesundheitswesens im Vergleich zur Zahlungsfähigkeit der Patienten gleich
ausgeprägt ist. Bezieht man jedoch die Qualität der Einrichtungen ein, erkennt man einen
ungleichen Zugang von Menschen mit unterschiedlichem sozio-ökonomischen Status. Die
reiche Bevölkerung wird in Provinzkrankenhäusern, die eine bessere und spezialisiertere
Behandlung ermöglichen, begünstigt. Einrichtungen mit begrenzter Behandlungsmöglich-
keit wie Gesundheitszentren und Gemeinschaftskrankenhäuser behandeln hingegen eher
die ärmeren Bevölkerungsschichten. Der Artikel diskutiert den ungleichen Zugang zum
Gesundheitswesen, die Fehlallokation von Gesundheitsressourcen im Land, die Anwen-
dung von Nebenzahlungen unter dem 30-Baht-Gesundheitssystem und die Überlappungen
in den Zuweisungen im Allgemeinen Gesundheitssystem Thailands.
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1 Introduction: Thailand and Universal Coverage (UC)
Universal Coverage (UC) generally aims at establishing equal rights in access to
health care as well as equal quality of care obtained by the patients, irrespective of
income group or socio-economic status. Considering the experiences of health care
reforms in developed countries, UC can be seen as a means to procure sufﬁcient
protection for patients against costly medical expenses by securing accessibility
to needed health care at affordable prices and, therefore, as a necessary attempt
to improve the health outcomes of the population. In UC, two dimensions of
coverage are incorporated – population coverage (health care for all) and health care
coverage (adequate health care). Even if UC is believed to promote access to health
care with the focus on vulnerable groups, completion of the coverage over the
whole population, nevertheless, does not guarantee adequate and equitable health
care coverage.
With the introduction of a new health scheme, the so-called 30 Baht Treat-
ing All Diseases Scheme, Universal Coverage (UC) was adopted nationwide in
Thailand in October 2001.1 Those who were not receiving health beneﬁts from
the two existing medical schemes – the Civil Servant Medical Beneﬁt Scheme
(CSMBS) and the Social Security Scheme (SSS) – were entitled to receive the 30
Baht card – or Gold Card – enabling them to access health care at the contracted
facilities for only 30 Baht (about 0.75 US dollar) co-payment at each episode.
In addition to the three main objectives of the UC policy declared by the
Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) in March 2001 – (1) universal coverage, (2)
single standard for beneﬁts and health care, and (3) sustainable system2 – in this
paper, it is suggested that another objective should also be added – fairness of
the beneﬁt allocation. The ﬁrst objective, the primary aim of the UC policy, is
to entitle all citizens to health care access according to their needs (equality of
access), while the second is to assure the same standard of beneﬁts and quality
of care provided (equality of allocation). Equality of access and allocation are
declared separately because access to treatments and receipt of the treatment are
not the same thing. The equality of access therefore will not necessarily result in
equal health care allocated according to needs (Le Grand 1982).3 Sustainability
1 The expansion of coverage to the whole country including the inner Bangkok districts was fully
implemented in April 2002. Tangcharoensathien et al. (2004), From Policy to Implementation.
2 WHO/SEA (2004), Regional overview of Social Health Insurance, Annex 6, pp. 196.
3 Culyer and Newhouse (ed.) (1993), Handbook of Health Economics: vol.1B, p.1812.
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of the system, the third objective, does not refer only to ﬁnancing, but also insti-
tutions and long term performance. The 30 Baht Scheme, a tax-based ﬁnancing
system via government subsidies not a contribution-based system like social health
insurance, is a combination of organizational and technical arrangements of na-
tional cross-subsidizing from “low-risk to high-risk“ individuals by “government
subsidy-pooling“.4 Fairness of beneﬁt allocation according to risk-related needs
therefore should be considered as one of the key objectives to achieve.
Due to the differences in beneﬁts and ﬁnancing practices among sub-health
ﬁnancing schemes, the distribution of health beneﬁts and implicit ﬁnancial assis-
tance are questioned and investigated in this study. Who are the major beneﬁciaries
and are the beneﬁts equally, progressively or regressively allocated among the pop-
ulation groups are the main analysis questions. An overview of the 3 sub-health
schemes under Thailand’s UC is given in the next section. The methodology,
named Beneﬁt Incidence Analysis (BIA), investigated in this study is described in
section 3. In section 4, distribution of the Beneﬁt Incidence for both outpatient
and inpatient care is presented. Brief discussions on aspects of equity, fairness and
accessibility are then given in section 5 with a summary and concluding remarks
in section 6.
2 Overview of the 3 Sub-Health Financing Schemes
Presently, Thailand’s public health security with UC consists of three major
health and welfare schemes. A summary of the main features of those schemes is
presented in table 1.
1) Civil Servant Medical Beneﬁt Scheme (CSMBS) is a package of welfare and
health care beneﬁts for active and retired government employees and public sector
workers, as well as their dependents including spouse, parents and children. In
2002, regarding the compilation from the Socio-Economic Survey (SES2002), the
number of government and public sector workers was estimated to be around
2.5-3 million and 6-6.5 million including their dependents; the latter represented
9-10 percent of total population.
The CSMBS is totally ﬁnanced via general taxes. Expenditure per beneﬁciary
was estimated to be as high as 3,800 Baht (Na Ranong V. et al. 2002). The rapid
4 As cited in WHR 2000 p.100, ’in the majority of health systems, risk and income cross-subsidization
occurs via a combination of two approaches: pooling and government subsidy’, ﬁnancing of the 30
Baht Scheme is an example of cross-subsidizing via the pooling of government subsidy.
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8 Chalermpol Chamchan
escalation of health expenditure in the CSMBS scheme is the result of problems
with cost-containment, especially incentives for providers to over-prescribe due
to the use of the fee-for-service payment method. However, a ﬁrst step in cost
containment was taken in April 2002 with the introduction of the Diagnosis
Related Groups (DRGs) system for the payment of inpatient services.
2) The Social Security Scheme (SSS) provides social health insurance beneﬁts
and is compulsory for employees in private enterprises with more than one
worker.5 However, presently compliance with the SSS is not yet complete. In
2002, the number of workers covered stood at around 6.90 million,6 out of 11.27
million employed in the private sector, representing about 11 to 12 percent of the
total population. The Social Security Ofﬁce (SSO) manages the SSS. Contributions
into the SSS fund are from three parties: employee, employer and the government,
each contributed 1 percent7 of the employee’s salary during the period 1998-2003
but will be 1.5 percent each from 2004 on. Providers that have a contract with the
SSO are paid on a capitation basis; the average amount per capita was 1,532 Baht
in 2002.
3) The 30 Baht Scheme was introduced to cover the population that was
neither covered by the CSMBS nor by the SSS; this particular population group
also included those that were formerly assisted by the Medical Welfare Scheme
(MWS) or covered via the Voluntary Health Card (VHC) scheme. The 30 Baht
Scheme derives its name from the amount patients have to pay themselves, the
co-payment, for each visit at the contracted health facility. The bulk of ﬁnancing,
however, comes via general tax revenue under the supervision of National Health
Security Ofﬁce (NHSO), Ministry of Public Health (MOPH). Health care is paid
for with the per capita method, the capitation, where the amount is calculated
on the basis of the number of people covered, the utilization rates, and the unit
cost for both outpatient and inpatient care. In 2002, with the use of the utilisation
rates and unit costs data from 1997 and 2000, respectively, the capitation amount
was assessed by the MOPH’s International Health Policy Programme (IHPP) at
1,202.4 Baht.8 In spite of the intention to achieve equitable service provisions at
5 During 1991 to 2002, the requirement was obliged only to the enterprises with or more than ten
workers.
6 Social Security Ofﬁce (SSO). Online: http://www.sso.go.th/knowledge/link/statisticsmid3.html.
7 Up to 1997, before the ﬁnancial crisis, the rate was once at 1.5 percent.
8 Re-calculated with the newly available data, the should-be capitation amount in 2002 was found
higher at 1,447 Baht. Patcharanaruemol, W. et al. 2004.
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affordable prices, the 30 Baht Scheme encountered problems of under-ﬁnancing,
budget limitation, and low rate capitation. Some have been concerned about the
qualities of care provided, as well as the sustainability and ﬁnancing feasibility of
the scheme in the long run.
3 Methodology: The Beneﬁt Incidence Analysis (BIA)
The Beneﬁt Incidence (BI) is deﬁned here as those costs not covered by way of
payments of patients but by the government and related health agencies. The
service-speciﬁc beneﬁt incidence is calculated as BIki = qkick – fki,9 where qki is the
quantity of speciﬁc service k (OP and IP care) utilized by individual i. ck is the unit
cost at the health facility in providing service k. And f is the medical expenses paid
by patients which cannot be reimbursed from the health security or insurance
system. In this paper, three types of public health facilities are considered: health
centers, community hospitals, and provincial hospitals.10
The distributions of service-speciﬁc BI are analysed by socio-economic deciles
where the patients are categorised in regard of their ’expenditure for consumption’.
Here, two categories of the deciles are considered. One is deciles-ranking within
the ’whole population’, while the other is one within ’the patients who utilise the
service at the facility type being analysed’.11
The BI’s distributions are examined regarding deciles in two categories.
a) Proportions of the BI attained by decile-groups
b) The Concentration Index (CI). The convention for Beneﬁt Incidence Analy-
sis (BIA) is that if a disproportionately large BI is attained by patients in the lower
deciles, in relation to ones in the higher deciles, the CI will take a negative value,
and vice versa.
c) The Kakwani Index (KI). The KI’s value ranges from 2 to -1, which is formu-
lated as KI = G – CI where CI is the BI’s concentration index and G is the Gini
coefﬁcient of the socio-economic variable. A positive value indicates progressivity
9 The complete formula is BIki = qkickj – fki, where ckj is the unit cost of providing service k in the
region where i resides, j. Due to the difﬁculties in classifying the individual by region and limitations
of data availability, ck is instead replaced.
10 Only the BI distributed at public facilities is examined as, at the beginning of UC implementation,
more than 90 percent of the contracted facilities are in the public sector.
11 Due to the fact that not everyone would get sick and utilize health cares at the speciﬁc facility type
being analyzed, the deciles in second category is, thus, the ranks only among patients get sick and
utilize the care.
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of the distribution that, out of the total, the poor get more proportion of beneﬁt
(even when compared to the rich it is less) than the proportion of socio-economic
values they possess and share in, and vice versa.12
Complementarily to the BIA,13 changes in the expense burdens of medical
services and medical supplies of the individual by deciles before and after UC
implementation are in addition examined.
4 Empirical Findings 2002
The ﬁndings14 consist of three subsections, of which the analyses of BI’s distribu-
tions for outpatient (OP) and inpatient (IP) care are presented in the ﬁrst and the
second subsection. The BIAs at speciﬁc types of health facility are exhibited by
decile-groups of the patients ranked by their socio-economic statuses, for which
the ’expenditure for consumption’ is used as the proxy, in two categories.
1. Category 1: The deciles ranked within the whole population are considered.
2. Category 2: The deciles ranked within only the patients who utilize health
cares are considered.
By deciles regarding each category, the BI’s distributions are analysed and
exhibited in two situations. One is when all patients are included, regardless of
which health ﬁnancing scheme they are covered by. The other is when only the
patients of the 30 Baht Scheme are included. Nevertheless, ﬁndings from the
BIA by deciles regarding category 2 for both OP and IP care show no signiﬁcant
differences between the situations, consequently, only the ﬁndings in the ﬁrst
situation are presented.
The last subsection demonstrates relative changes in medical expense burdens
of the individuals before and after the UC implementation.
12 A progressive beneﬁt incidence, simply indicating the vertical equity, is deﬁned as one whose average
rate falls as gross income increases. Ducros J.Y. (1995).
13 World Bank (WB), Quantitative Techniques for Health Equity Analysis (World Bank): Technical note
12.
14 See Appendix (B) for the sources of data.
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4.1 The BIA for Outpatient (OP) Care
By Deciles of Total Population (Category 1)
According to table 2, when all patients are included in the analyses, the Concen-
tration Indexes (CIs) of the BI’s distributions at health centers and community
hospitals are negative, implying a disproportionately larger share of BI is allocated
to the poor patients, while at provincial hospitals the index is positive, implying
conversely that the larger share is instead allocated to the rich patients. The
poorest patients in D1 attain around 21 percent of total BI distributed at health
centers, while ones in D2-D5 each receive around 13 to 15 percent of the BI at
community hospitals. At provincial hospitals, the largest portion (16 percent), on
the other hand, is delivered to the richest patients in D10. Of the BI distributed
in total, CI is negative with a small magnitude. Patients in the middle deciles
from D2 to D7 are found as the major beneﬁciaries. The portion to each decile
is around 10 to 12 percent of total BI that the largest one to D5 is 13.2 percent.
In all cases, the Kakwani Index (KI) appears positive even with varied magnitude.
It implies that the BI is distributed progressively to the socio-economic status by
deciles, regarding the ranks in category 1.
When only the patients of the 30 Baht Scheme are considered, CIs of the
distributions at health centers and community hospitals are also negative with
indifferent magnitude, compared to the case when all patients are considered.
Of the distribution at provincial hospitals, even though CI is still positive, its
magnitude is signiﬁcantly less (0.1795 and 0.0257). The percentage of BI attained
by the poor in D1-D5 is obviously higher, while that attained by the rich from
D8 up to D10 is accordingly lower. Tentatively, the 30 Baht Scheme seems able to
better assist patients in the middle-lower classes from D2 to D5, those in average
each attain 13 to 15 percent of the total BI for OP cares. Kakwani Indexes (KI) with
larger magnitude also collaborate the improved progressivity of BI’s distributions.
By Deciles of Patients (Category 2)
Presented in table 3, the distributions of BI at all facility types – health centers,
community hospitals and even provincial hospitals – are pro-poor with negative
CIs by the decile-groups in category 2. The poor patients, especially in D1 and D2,
are found attaining the largest proportion of BI. Kakwani Indexes (KIs) are also
positive, corroborating progressivity of the distributions in all cases. From what
12 Chalermpol Chamchan
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we found by deciles in category 1, this evidence differs from case to case, especially
in the case of provincial hospitals where the rich patients are now attaining the
lesser portion of BI as compared to the poor patients.15 The contrasts between
the ﬁndings by deciles in the two categories will be discussed later in the aspects
of equalities, fairness and accessibilities in section 5.
Table 3: BI for OP Care by Health Facility and Socio-Economic Deciles (Category 2)
Deciles Health Center Community Hospital Provincial Hospital Total
D1 (Poorest) 14.4% 12.7% 12.6% 14.10%
D2 13.7% 11.5% 12.4% 13.70%
D3 11.7% 11.7% 10.9% 11.70%
D4 11.1% 11.8% 10.9% 10.30%
D5 7.6% 11.8% 9.1% 10.40%
D6 11.0% 11.2% 10.6% 9.70%
D7 10.2% 10.5% 10.1% 10.40%
D8 7.1% 10.3% 7.3% 5.80%
D9 8.6% 3.5% 7.7% 7.20%
D10 (Richest) 4.6% 4.9% 8.4% 6.80%
CIs -0.1475 -0.1402 -0.0901 -0.1410
KIs 0.4530 0.4698 0.5026 0.3750
Notes: For both outpatient and inpatient care (table 5), the BI’s distribution among all patients is solely
presented. When only patients of the 30 Baht Scheme are considered, the patterns of the BI’s distribution are
insigniﬁcantly different and, therefore, not presented.
Source: Author, computed from the database of the Socio-Economic Survey (SES2002), NSO.
4.2 The BIA for Inpatient (IP) Cares
By Deciles of Total Population (Category 1)
As for the situation when all patients are included, the Concentration Index (CI) of
the BI’s distribution for IP cares is negative (pro-poor) with signiﬁcant magnitude
at community hospitals, but slightly positive (pro-rich) at provincial hospitals.
At community hospitals, around 30 percent of the BI distributed is attained by
poor patients in the two poorest deciles, D1 and D2, while only about 6 percent is
attained by rich patients in D9 and D10. At provincial hospitals, on the contrary,
less than 14 percent of BI is distributed to patients in D1 and D2 while nearly 23
15 The patients are from the same group but classiﬁed differently according to each category of decile.
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percent is distributed to patients in D9 and D10. The BI’s distribution in total
tends to be pro-poor with negative CI. The proportion each attained by patients
in D1 up to D4 is around 10 percent, in D5 and D6 is around 11 to 12 percent,
and in D8 up to D10 is the least, around 8 percent. Regarding Kakwani Indexes
(KIs), BI is indicated distributed progressively to the socio-economic status by
deciles at all cases.
Table 4: BI for OP Care by Health Facility and Socio-Economic Deciles (Category 1)
Deciles All patients The 30 Baht Scheme’s patients
Community Provincial Total Community Provincial Total
Hospital Hospital Hospital Hospital
D1 (Poorest) 14.5% 7.6% 10.10% 15.6% 10.8% 12.90%
D2 16.1% 6.2% 9.90% 19.3% 9.0% 13.50%
D3 14.2% 8.1% 10.30% 15.6% 11.9% 13.50%
D4 12.3% 9.0% 10.20% 12.8% 11.8% 12.20%
D5 13.5% 12.3% 12.70% 12.9% 13.7% 13.30%
D6 10.2% 11.7% 11.10% 9.4% 12.5% 11.20%
D7 7.9% 12.6% 10.80% 7.1% 12.6% 10.30%
D8 5.0% 9.9% 8.10% 2.8% 7.7% 5.50%
D9 4.1% 11.2% 8.60% 3.5% 6.3% 5.10%
D10 (Richest) 2.3% 11.5% 8.10% 0.9% 3.8% 2.50%
CIs -0.2560 0.0892 -0.039 -0.3278 -0.1016 -0.199
KIs 0.6635 0.3183 0.4465 0.7353 0.5091 0.6068
Source: Author, computed from the database of the Socio-Economic Survey (SES2002), NSO.
When only the IP’s patients of the 30 Baht Scheme are included, similar
remarks to the BIA for outpatient (OP) care are discovered. At community
hospitals, larger proportions of BI are distributed to patients in the low deciles
from D1 up to D5, compared to those in the rich deciles, especially from D8
up to D10. CI, consistently, appears more negative than when all patients are
included. At provincial hospitals, CI turns negative (-), patients in the middle
deciles are found as the major beneﬁciaries. By proportion, patients in the poorest
group beneﬁt around 11 percent, while ones in the richest group receive just only
3.8 percent. Of the BI attained by the 30 Baht Scheme’s patients in total, the
distribution is indicated to be more pro-poor with the larger negative magnitude
of CI preferentially apportioned to patients from the low up to the middle deciles,
from D1 to D5, than to ones in the upper deciles, from D8 to D10.
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By Deciles of Patients (Category 2)
By deciles regarding category 2, the distribution patterns of the BI for IP care
are similar to ones we ﬁnd in the BIA for OP care. CIs are negative in all cases,
connoting patients in the low deciles obtain a larger percentage of the BI compared
to ones in the high deciles. The gaps in beneﬁt obtainment can obviously be seen
by comparisons between D1 (or D2) and D10 (or D9). Of the total BI distributed,
patients in the two poorest deciles attain 28 percent while others in the two richest
deciles receive only about 14 percent.
Table 5: BI for OP Care by Health Facility and Socio-Economic Deciles (Category 2)
Deciles Community Hospital Provincial Hospital Total
D1 (Poorest) 11.3% 11.3% 15.30%
D2 11.0% 10.8% 12.70%
D3 10.7% 10.7% 10.60%
D4 10.6% 10.6% 11.70%
D5 10.9% 9.9% 10.60%
D6 11.5% 10.1% 9.70%
D7 10.7% 9.5% 8.20%
D8 9.6% 8.8% 6.90%
D9 7.0% 9.7% 7.20%
D10 (Richest) 6.8% 8.7% 7.10%
CIs -0.0724 -0.0445 -0.1422
Kis 0.4177 0.4535 0.3940
Source: Author, computed from the database of the Socio-Economic Survey (SES2002), NSO.
4.3 The Burden of Personal Medical Expenses: Year 2000 and
2002
Regarding ﬁgure 1, as an average percentage of total consumption expenditure, the
burden of medical care expenses decreases in all deciles16 for both OP and IP care
in 2002. In addition, the reductions found are signiﬁcantly larger in the poorest
decile (D1, from 31 percent to 12 percent) than in the richest decile (D10, from
21 percent to 16 percent). Once in 2000, the percentage of the burden was even
higher in D1 than D10, this exemplar changes conversely in 2002.
16 The deciles are ranked for the whole population.
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Figure 1: Medical Care Expense as Percentage of Total Consumption Expenditure by Deciles:
2000 and 2002
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Year 2002 = 15.6 % 
Source: Author, computed from the database of the SES2000 and the SES2002, Record 6, NSO.
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The Kakwani Indexes in table 6 also corroborate changes as in the evidence
above. The burden of expenses for OP and IP care altered from being regressive
(-) in 2000 to progressive (+) in 2002, just one of the medical supplies is still found
regressive, with negative KI.
Table 6: Comparison of Kakwani Indexes of the Medical Expenses
Expense Items 2000 2002
OP service expense -0.0646 0.05237
IP service expense -0.0536 0.03159
Total medical service expenses (OP+IP) (1) -0.0472 0.04692
Medical supplies expense (2) -0.127 -0.148
Notes: + Values: Progressive, - Values: Regressive
Source: Author, computed from the database of the SES2000 and the SES2002, Record 6, NSO.
5 Beneﬁt Incidence Allocation: Inequality, Fairness,
and Accessibility
Combining the ﬁndings from BIA by deciles in two categories for OP and IP care
brings us to some inferences.
In respect of the decile-groups in category 2, the implicit health assistance,
deﬁned as the Beneﬁt Incidence (BI), is allocated in regard to the ability to pay17
of the patients who utilize speciﬁc care – outpatient and inpatient care – at all types
of public health facility. Simply said, by dividing patients into ten groups equally
according to their socio-economic status, we ﬁnd those in the lower deciles gain
the larger share of BI than ones in the higher deciles. Nevertheless, respecting the
deciles in category 1 ranked within the whole population, unfair BI’s distributions
by the gradations of health facility type are discovered. BI distributed at health
centers is mainly allocated to patients in the poor deciles (only for OP care). At
community hospitals it is allocated more to patients in the middle to low deciles,
while at provincial hospitals, in contrast, it is allocated more to those in the rich
deciles. In other words, there is a descending order in the level of health facilities
in the distribution of BI across the range of patients, regarding the deciles of the
whole population.
17 Daniels et al. (1996), Benchmarks of Fairness for Health Care Reforms: Benchmark 5 of Health Equity.
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Figure 2: Patterns of Health Care Utilisation by Quintiles (Q1 & Q5) as Percentage of Total
Visits, 2002
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OP cares IP cares
HU CH PH PrH Private Clinic Others
Source: Author, computed from the database of the Socio-Economic Survey (SES2002), NSO.
In ﬁgure 2, patterns of health care utilisation by patients by quintiles (Q1 and
Q5) are presented. The ﬁgure indicates nearly 70 percent of patients in the poorest
quintile (Q1) visit health centers (HU) and community hospitals (CH) for OP
care, while about 24 percent and 20 percent of those in the richest quintile (Q5)
visit provincial hospitals (PH) and private hospitals, respectively. On average,
regardless of the quintiles, one-third of the patients utilise the care at private clinics
where, in most of the cases, all medical expenses are paid out-of-pocket, and about
20 percent of patients use health care at health centers and community hospitals,
respectively.
For IP care, more than 65 percent of patients in Q1 visit community hospitals,
while 44 percent and 38 percent in Q5 go to private hospitals and provincial
hospitals, respectively. On average, community hospitals are counted as the ﬁrst
alternative (about 41 percent) while provincial hospitals are the second (about 38
percent) for patients for IP care.
From these patterns of care utilising, inequitable access by patients across
the socio-economic statuses are tentatively indicated. Looking at ﬁgure 3, with
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Figure 3: Percentage of Visits at Health Facilities by Quintiles, 2002
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Source: Author, computed from the database of the Socio-Economic Survey (SES2002), NSO.
the evidence in percentage of visits at health facilities by patients in quintiles,
the hypothesis above is veriﬁed. Health care at facilities in the lower levels of
gradation – health centers and community hospitals – is more proportionately
utilised by poor patients in Q1 and Q2, in contrast to care provided at facilities in
the higher level – provincial hospitals – which are utilised more by rich patients
in Q4 and Q5.
Ideologically, Universal Coverage (UC) involves the basic principles of uni-
versal inclusion and universal access, or coverage and participation.18 Universal
inclusion is a necessary condition but not sufﬁcient to ensure equitable and uni-
versal access to health care provided. For Thailand, as shown by the evidence,
even if coverage with public health assistance has helped patients, especially those
of poor status, eliminate the ﬁnancial barriers, they are possibly still prevented
from accessing health cares by some non-ﬁnancial barriers, which are the matters
of geography (distance to health facilities), cost of transportation (both in terms of
time and expense), income lost from not working, availability of health resources,
patient capacities as well as the range of treatments the facilities (in their access)
18 Daniels et al. (1996), Benchmarks of Fairness for Health Care Reforms: Benchmark 1 of Health Equity.
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can provide (concerning types of health facility, availability of health practitioners,
equipment and technology) and so on. Besides the attempts to lessen ﬁnancial
barriers with the adoption of the UC, focuses of the reform should also be on the
attempts to eliminate non-ﬁnancial barriers in the health system, especially to the
poor citizens residing in the poor remote areas.
Figure 4: Means of Medical Expenses by Patients in the Poorest Quintile (Q1)
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Source: Author, computed from the database of the Socio-Economic Survey (SES2002), NSO.
From the BIA, we suggest two obstacles keeping poor patients from accessing
health cares at high level facilities, such as provincial hospitals, should be given
attention. One is ﬁnancial expense (barriers) in relation to types and levels of
health facility. We can see from the SES2002 that for the poorest patients (in
Q1), the mean cost of medical expenses for each outpatient and inpatient visit at
provincial hospitals is found to be much higher than that at community hospitals
(in ﬁgure 4). Focusing on vulnerable patient groups who might pay less for health
care than the richer groups in general, it is suggested that equitable assistance
should be provided more speciﬁcally to them especially when utilizing advanced
treatments and costly health care at provincial hospitals.
The other matter is the provision and allocation of health resources, speciﬁcally
health facilities, staff, practitioners and provision of health care with sophisticated
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treatments – across a region and between regions of Thailand. Structural inequities
in health resource distributions exist in Thailand’s health system (Pannarunothai
2000) and are critical non-ﬁnancial barriers to poor patients in remote areas. At
the provincial level, for example, provincial hospitals with advanced equipment,
skilful practitioners and modern technology for a wide range of sophisticated
treatments are generally situated in the cities where they are far more costly to
access by mostly low-income people in the rural areas than by generally middle
and higher income people in, or near to, the city.
At the inter-regional level, as presented in table 7, unbalanced health resource
allocations are evident. The ratio of population to doctor and population to bed
indicate that health resources are bunched in Bangkok and in the central area,
while sparse in the Northeast, where most of the poorest live.19 In the Northeast
there are 7,251 people per doctor, while in Bangkok there are 952 people per
doctor. Even 279 health facilities out of the total of 816 are situated in this region,
259 of them are community hospitals and only 20 are provincial hospitals; in
contrast to the central area, where 173 out of 208 are community hospitals while
35 are provincial hospitals.
Accessibility to health care by the citizens is considered as a pivotal goal of the
health system in equity missions.20 From the experiences of health system reform
in developed countries (Docteur et al. 2003), three steps in improving access to
health care and health outcomes are emphasised.
Figure 5: Improving Health Care Accessibility and Health Outcomes
(2) Ensuring
adequate and 
equitable access to
needed health 
service.
(3) Increasing the 
effectiveness of
health system
(1) Assuring
universal and 
comprehensive
health insurance 
coverage.
Source: Docteur et al. 2003.
19 According to SES2002, half of the 20 percent of the poorest population (Q1) resides in the Northeast.
20 Equity missions of the health system are to remove the barriers to good health care, prevent
illness and improve the quality of life of people who are already sick, especially among vulnerable
populations in marginalized groups. Evans et al. 2001.
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The evidence indicates that coverage only (step 1) is not sufﬁcient to guarantee
equity in all aspects of health service access (step 2). Factors underlying access
problems are shortages and misallocations of health facilities and practitioners,
timely availability of services, socio-cultural barriers and other non-ﬁnancial
barriers. At the moment, Thailand’s health system is in the early stage of achieving
universal coverage and ensuring its citizens access to health care. The next missions,
hence, are to make sure that access to care across population groups is adequate
and equitable, with better provision, as well as allocation, of health resources.
In addition to equitable access, overlaps among ﬁnancing schemes of Thai
UC in terms of beneﬁts provided and related regulations, and requirement of the
co-payment to the 30 Baht Scheme might also be proposed a revision.
The CSMBS, with the overlying beneﬁts as well as the government subsidy
per head, of which nearly 50 percent of the covered people lives in the highest
socio-economic quintile (Q5), is judged superior to the others, which are the SSS
and the 30 Baht Scheme. As denoted in section 2, the CSMBS is wholly ﬁnanced
via the government subsidy with per capita expenditure estimates as high as 3,800
Baht in 2002, much higher than that of the SSS and the 30 Baht Scheme which
were 1,532 Baht and 1,202.4 Baht, respectively (Na Ranong et al. 2002). To realign
the overlaps seems difﬁcult and complicated because of various factors; such as the
characteristics and establishment history of each scheme those are quite different.
Under the 30 Baht Scheme, which does not require prepaid contributions as in
the social health insurance scheme (the SSS), a ﬁxed 30 Baht is required to co-pay at
each episode of care utilisation. The ﬁxed amount is aimed to ensure equality and
non-discrimination among the patients. It is not equitable respecting the ﬁnancial
resource status of patients across the income or socio-economic groups, and
suggested to be revised, especially for health care provided at high-level facilities.
At provincial hospitals, for example, the average cost of health care is relatively
more costly compared to care at community hospitals. Under the ﬁnancing
regime of the 30 Baht Scheme, it consequently implies larger subsidies from the
government are needed to subsidise costs of the same care provided at provincial
hospitals.
As known, due to the structural inequalities between the urban and rural areas,
the better off seem in a better position to access health care provided by provincial
hospitals. Thus, co-payments as a percentage of health care costs at each episode
might be a more appropriate option than a ﬁxed one, with some exemptions
or assistance for the worse-off patients from vulnerable groups. Hopefully, this
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would help make cross-subsidization among patients possible, especially when the
hospitals are ﬁnanced21 (or under-ﬁnanced) with limited budgets.
6 Summary and Conclusions
This study adopts the Beneﬁt Incidence Analysis (BIA) by socio-economic deciles
in Thailand’s health system, with Universal Coverage (UC), in 2002. Here, the
Beneﬁt Incidence (BI) is deﬁned as parts of medical costs that are not purchased by
the patients themselves out-of-pocket but implicitly assisted with the government
subsidies via a pooling ﬁnancing regime. Health centers, community hospitals
and provincial hospitals are looked at in the analyses for outpatient (OP) care,
while only the latter two for inpatient (IP) cares.
By socio-economic deciles ranked by the patients who utilize health care at a
speciﬁc type of health facility (category 2), the distributions of BI are found pro-
portionately pro-poor at all facility types for both outpatient (OP) and inpatient
(IP) care. This implies, at all types of facility, patients in the low deciles are more
attentively assisted than patients in the high deciles. When the deciles ranked
within the whole population (no matter if they utilise health care or not – cate-
gory 1) are considered, however, unfairness in BI distribution by the gradations of
health facility type is discovered. Facilities with better capacities for sophisticated
care and treatments – provincial hospitals – seem better at beneﬁtting rich patients
in the high deciles, while ones with a limited range of treatments provided - health
centers and community hospitals – seem better at beneﬁtting poor patients in the
low deciles, in contrast. This phenomenon reﬂects inequitable accessibilities to
advanced and high cost health care, especially for patients of low socio-economic
status, and is discussed relating to ﬁnancial expenses (or barriers) in relation to
types and levels of health facility and the provision, as well as allocation, of health
resources across a region and between regions in Thailand.
UC is considered as a signiﬁcant way to achieve universal inclusion of the
whole population, but not sufﬁcient to ensure equitable universal access of neces-
sary health care. To bring more fairness in health care access and distribution of
21 As denoted, majority of health facilities (more than 90 percent) contracted to the 30 Baht Scheme
is in public sector. The ﬁnancing to them after the adoption of the 30 Baht Schemes are mainly
from two sources, (1) the UC budget of the 30 Baht Scheme allocated with the capitation basis
and (2) reimbursed medical fees from patients of the CSMBS and SSS, with small portion of the
co-payments from patients of the 30 Baht Scheme.
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Beneﬁt Incidence, not only ﬁnancial factors, but also non-ﬁnancial factors need to
be taken into account.
Appendix
(A) Sources of Data
The 2002 Household Socio-Economic Survey (SES2002)
Conducted by the National Statistical Ofﬁce (NSO), the SES collects the infor-
mation on household income, expenditure, debt, housing characteristics, as well
as the ownership of selected durable goods and changes in assets and liabilities of
the household. The survey was at ﬁrst time conducted in 1957 and later on for
every ﬁve years, which then was changed to every two years in 1987. SES2002
is the latest available at the time with a special record of questionnaire inserted
on ’morbidity and medical care of household member’ (record 10), which is the
record we mainly use the data from for the BIA. Household’s expenditure on
medical services and medical supplies is recorded in the ’consumption on goods
and services’ (record 6), the coverage of health insurance is in the ’household
member characteristics, getting welfare and beneﬁts’ (record 2), and monthly per
capita consumption expenditure is in ’household’s economic status’ (record 1).
Financial and Activities 0110 Report 5
This is the ﬁnancial report on income, expenditure and activities in health service
provisions of health facilities contracted to the UC, which is submitted monthly
to the Department of Health Service Support (DHSS), Ministry of Public Health
(MOPH). Its purposes are for uses in evaluating and monitoring the performances
of health service providers, and as well implications as for health policy decisions.
This paper uses the data of 2000, 2002 and 2003 – which has been adjusted from
monthly to annually set with kind assistance from DHSS – in the calculation of
health care unit costs.
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(B) The Calculation of Health Care Unit Costs
With the use of Financial and Activity 0110 Report 5 of public hospitals22 and
quick method of unit cost calculation (Tisyaticom et al. 2001), the summary
of unit costs calculated in this study (a), together with the reference from the
International Health Policy Programs (IHPP) (b), during 2000 to 2003 is presented
in table 8.
Table 8: The Calculation of Unit Cost (per Visit) by Type of Facility (Unit: Baht)
Year 2000** 2001** 2002* 2003*
Outpatient (OP) cares
Health Centers 60.00 62 – –
Private Clinics 221 100 – –
Community Hospitals 221 262 226.185 310.414
Provincial Hospitals 278 378 382.326 556.411
Private Hospitals 278 353 – –
Inpatient (IP) cares
Community Hospitals 2,857 3,669 3,166.575 4,345.796
Provincial Hospitals 5,424 6,812 6,881.868 10,015.385
Private Hospitals 5,424 6,350 – –
Source: * Author 2004, computed from the Financial and Activity 0110 Report 5, MOPH. ** Tangchareon-
sathien et al., IHPP 2001.
Except for health center that its unit cost in 2001 is used as a proxy, the unit
costs presented above in 2002 are employed in the BIA for the rest of health facility
types.
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